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ABSTRACT
Directors’ remuneration research has traditionally focused on 
total salary, cash compensation and long–term incentives plans. 
Consequently, a systematic study on short–term annual bonus 
is lacking. To address this omission, this study is conducted to 
investigate the trend of bonus received by the executive directors 
among Malaysian companies publicly listed on Bursa Malaysia in 
the current economic condition from 2008 to 2010. The study also 
examines the relationship between the executive directors’ bonus 
and shareholders’ value, specifically defined by firm performance, as 
measured using stock return (SR) and earning per share (EPS) and 
by firm size, as measured using the total number of employee, so as 
to test the practice of the principle corporate governance among the 
Malaysian listed companies from two different theories, i.e. agency 
theory and power theory. For firm performance, the findings support 
the agency theory since directors’ bonus is found to be positively 
associated with firm performance, as measured by EPS. However, the 
findings found no significant relationship between directors’ bonus 
and stock return. For firm size, the findings support both theories 
since directors’ bonus is found to be positively associated with firm 
performance as measured by total sales and negatively associated with 
firm size as measured by total number of employee. Consistent with 
the previous studies on executive bonuses, this association remains 
weak. However, power theory revealed that weak governance may 
foster the rise of powerful directors and thus, weaken the corporate 
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governance value in a company. Therefore, it is suggested that close 
monitoring of directors’ remuneration should continue and shareholders 
should remain extra vigilant.
Keywords: Directors’ remuneration, corporate governance, directors’ 
bonus, shareholders’ value, firm performance, firm size, agency theory, 
self–serving management perspective, power theory.
Introduction
Many studies have been conducted to investigate the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and firm performance (eg: Conyon and Leech, 
1994; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Ibrahim et al., 2005; Abdul Rahman and 
Mohd Zawawi, 2005). Indirectly, firm performance seems to be the most 
likely capacity to measure shareholders’ value.  Some researchers claim 
that there is no significant relationship between directors’ remuneration 
and firm performance (eg: Ibrahim et al., 2005; Abdul Rahman and Mohd 
Zawawi, 2005). According to Conyon and Leech (1994), public concern 
has been expressed that the compensation packages received by those at 
the head of the corporation are not justified by the underlying economic 
performance of the company. Hence, this study takes one step ahead to 
explore one neglected element of directors’ remuneration i.e. annual bonus 
in examining the relationship between directors’ bonus and shareholders’ 
value in Malaysia.   
A study on annual bonus is done by Jay Daniel Fattorusso (2006) for the 
award of Doctor of Philosophy at Loughborough University titled, ‘UK 
Executive Pay: The Special Case of Executive Bonus’.  The results of the 
study demonstrated that there is a positive association between bonus pay 
and firm performance, both using internal and external measurement; i.e. 
earnings per share (EPS) and total shareholders’ return (TSR), respectively 
by using the agency theory approach to reflect the principal and agent 
connectivity.  In addition, the study further explores the relationship from 
the power theory (self-serving management approach) as to cater the 
complexity of the different interests in ownership types. This resulted that 
bonus pay is negatively associated with firm performance from the power 
theory approach.  On top of that, Fattorusso (2006) also discussed on the 
relationship between executive bonus and firm size as an extended view 
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of firm performance from both approaches mentioned earlier. Fattorusso 
(2006) found that bonus pay and firm size is not positively associated from 
the agency theory perception while it is positively associated from the power 
theory point of view.   
On this note, it is crucial to investigate the relationship between directors’ 
bonus, being part of an important element in the directors’ remuneration 
and the shareholders’ value represented by firm performance and firm size 
in the current economic condition on the fact that the stability of corporate 
governance is being practiced by most of the companies in Malaysia as 
compared to the time when corporate governance was at its initial stage 
back in the year 2000. Hence, based on a sample of 74 (from the total of 545 
observations) companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia, this study investigates 
the relationship between directors’ bonus and shareholders’ value of the 
Malaysian listed companies for the year 2008 until the year 2010. The 
said period is deemed to be an appropriate period of study on the basis of 
readily available information and familiarity in the subject of corporate 
governance amongst the listed companies in Malaysia. For the purpose 
of the study, the sample is selected from the listed companies in all main 
industries on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. Directors’ remuneration 
is further delved into directors’ bonus portion while shareholders’ value, 
which is represented by firm performance, is measured using stock return 
(SR) and earnings per share (EPS) while firm size is measured using total 
number of employee and total sales.    
This study is not only significant to ascertain the relationship between the 
directors’ bonus and shareholders’ value, but further to reveal what are the 
patterns of the bonus received by the executive directors for Malaysian 
listed companies in the current economic condition. The most important 
thing is to discover whether the board of directors is mindful of enhancing 
shareholders’ value, a cornerstone of corporate governance by implementing 
the agency theory approach or are they still mindful of enhancing their 
own wealth, as argued by the power theory.  The findings from this study 
will contribute to the literature on the correlation or relationship between 
directors’ bonus and firms’ performance as well as firms’ size, which 
indirectly represent the shareholders’ value.  
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Agency Theory 
The idea of agency theory has been long discussed by scholars in various 
fields specifically accounting (eg: Garen, 1994; McColgan, 2001). In fact, 
literature on agency theory have been explored during the 1960s and 1970s 
describing the risk–sharing problem as one that arises when co-operating 
parties have different attitudes toward risk (Clarke, 2007). Subsequently, 
agency theory had broaden this risk–sharing concepts by including the 
‘agency problem’ that occurs when the co-operating parties have different 
goals. Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their article mentioned that the 
concern of agency theory lies in the incentive problems that arise when 
the decision making in a firm falls on managers who are not the firm’s 
shareholders. Given the various versions of agency theory definition, it is 
well understood that the principal or shareholders are given no option than 
to partly (to some extent, mostly) delegate the decision making process to 
the agents or directors who run the company despite the divergence desires 
and risk–attitude between them, i.e. agency conflicts.
Agency theory is also best explained in the form of corporate governance. 
This is because the theory holds that managers will not act to maximize 
the returns to shareholders unless appropriate governance structures are 
implemented as a mechanism to safeguard the interests of shareholders 
(Donaldson and Davis, 2001). Furthermore, the definition of corporate 
governance suggested by the High Level Finance Committee Report on 
Corporate Governance (1999) obviously implies the similar direction 
with agency theory. This is supported by McDonald et al. (2008) in which 
corporate governance factors can also be employed to remedy the agency 
problem, at least in part and thereby reduce the agency costs to increase 
the alignment of managers’ personal interest with the core interest of 
shareholders. 
power Theory
Power theory emphasizes the fundamental misalignment of interests 
between the principal and the agent (Fattorusso, 2006). From the word 
‘power theory’ itself, it is understood that the managerial power is heavily 
associated with the separation of ownership referring to a situation where 
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power and control of the corporation has been shifted away from the 
common stockholders (Fattorusso, 2006). However, the managerial power 
perspective does not assume that directors seek to get the best deal for 
shareholders (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005). This is because power can 
also be abused when executives are self–serving and being opportunistic 
towards the undaunted power given by the shareholders. Additionally, 
management may pursue its own interest obliviously to the welfare of the 
owners (Werner and Tosi, 1995).  
Based on the above, with the directors having most of the power, it is 
important that the shareholders have the power in the company as well. In 
order to prevent directors from straying shareholders’ interest, shareholders 
should proficiently make use of such power (Bebchuk, 2003). For example, 
should the shareholders not be satisfied with the action of their elected 
representatives, they have the power to turn the board out. As a result, 
power plays a central role in various aspects of corporate governance. This 
is proven by Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) who discussed managerial 
power and how it is dependent with the ownership structure of the firm, the 
board composition as well as its duality. 
Directors’ Remuneration and firm performance
Studies on correlation of personal returns received by directors to the returns 
received by shareholders have been extensively discussed by Western 
researchers especially in the US and UK. Many of the debates in those 
countries revolve around the linkage of directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance from the various researchers’ perspectives in defining directors’ 
remuneration as well as firm performance. No matter how diversify the 
arguments are, the result of the discussion is biased towards the existence 
of the relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm performance 
at a very small substance (eg: Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995). 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) prove that there is a positive relationship between 
cash compensation and firm performance in a well-known study on 2,213 
CEOs in the US for the periods of 1974 to 1986. Researchers in the UK 
also found a very small sensitivity between directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance. In the same vein, the issue on relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and firm performance does receive much attention in other 
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countries than the US and UK since the interests on directors’ compensation 
are a world–wide surge that investors, analysts, policy makers, journalists 
and the public are always keen on. However, less research has been 
conducted in other countries as the disclosure of the directors’ remuneration 
do not go far enough in those countries (Kabir, 2008).
In the Malaysian context, Dogan and Smyth (2002) have made an attempt 
to fill the gap in the Asian literature by conducting a research on the 
determinants of board compensation in Malaysian firms listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange over the periods of 1989 to 2000. Dogan and Smyth 
(2002) however found that directors’ remuneration is positively correlated 
with stock market performance but negatively correlated with accounting 
measures. On top of that, Ibrahim et al. (2005) has further explored the 
relationship between directors’ compensation and firm performance 
among companies in Malaysia using data from 1999 to 2001. The study 
intends to see the relationship subsequent to the announcement of the new 
ruling on corporate governance by the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in 
2000 which was predicted to be stronger in 2001 as compared to the pre-
implementation period. However, the findings show that there is a non–
significant relationship between pay and performance in 2001 and instead, 
Malaysian companies tend to link directors’ remuneration with growth and 
size rather than performance.  
bonus – based Incentives  
There has been little research on split directors’ remuneration between 
base salary and bonus. One of the obvious reasons is because both are 
rarely broken down separately. Veliyath (1999) has defined salary as cash 
compensation that is determined at the beginning of an annual pay cycle, 
while annual bonus is defined as cash compensation that is determined at 
the end of an annual pay cycle and is based on only one–year’s worth of 
performance information.  Hence, annual bonus seems to be an important 
component in directors’ remuneration as it reflects short–term performance 
of a company (Holthausen et al., 1995; Fattorusso, 2006).      
Subsequent to the corporate scandals i.e. Enron and WorldCom that relates 
to the proliferation of stock options in the CEO pay, the bonus is likely to 
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become an even more important component of CEO compensation (Sheikh, 
2008). Studies that specifically examine the executive bonuses are found 
to be positively, though weakly, associated to shareholders’ value and 
thus, no evidence of bonus being a purely manager–serving device (Bruce 
et al., 2007). However, this result is in contrast with that of Healy (1985) 
who concluded that bonus schemes create incentives for managers to select 
accounting procedures and accruals to maximize the value of their bonus 
awards. 
Value of the Annual bonus and firm performance
Agency theory is based on the premise that the principal (shareholders) 
delegate duties to the agent (the board and CEO) who is expected to act in 
the best interest of the shareholders. As such, it is the boards’ responsibility 
to design compensation schemes that provide managers with efficient 
incentives towards maximizing shareholders’ value (Bebchuk, 2003). 
Hence, based on the empirical evidence from those studies, agency theory 
assumes that the board will design bonus schemes based on performance 
targets that contribute to the shareholders’ wealth.
Existing literature that exclusively examine the short–term annual bonus 
and firm performance include Bushman et al. (1995), McKnight (1996), 
Fattorusso (2006) and Bruce et al. (2007). For example, Bushman et al. 
(1995) found that 33.7% of the average division CEO’s annual bonus in 
246 public domestic firms in the US are based on group level or corporate 
level performance measures. Similar relationship is found in Fattorusso’s 
(2006) study that supports the agency theory’s views as the bonus amount 
is positively associated with financial performance, both measured using 
EPS and TSR. Hence, the first hypothesis for the study under the agency 
theory is as follows:
H1a: The value of directors’ bonus is positively associated with firm 
performance, as measured by stock return and EPS.
As for the power theory, the conflict of interest between principal and 
agent is due to the self–serving executives with opportunistic behavior who 
will participate in dysfunctional conduct when given necessary latitude 
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(Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Fattorusso, 2006). Moreover, since ownership 
and control have become more dispersed due to the separation of control 
between shareholders and executives, the power theory suggests that 
executives are able to fully entrench themselves in the entire company and 
extract greater rents through their compensation arrangements, oblivious 
to the welfare of the owners (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).  In addition, Choi 
(2008) comments that as CEO’s power becomes stronger,  he may be free 
to undertake excessively high risk projects for personal gain, potentially 
resulting in large losses for the firm. Hence, it is assumed that under this 
theory, the following hypothesis is as follows:
H1b: The value of directors’ bonus is negatively associated with firm 
performance, as measured by stock return and EPS.
Value of the Annual bonus and firm Size
Although the relationship between directors’ compensation and firm size 
provides less attention as compared to firm performance, there have been 
a number of researches conducted on this for the past five decades (eg: 
McGuire et al., 1962; Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970). Using more current 
evidence, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) found an interesting evidence that 
the increase in firm size is followed by higher CEO pay but the decrease 
in firm size is not followed by lower CEO pay. This implies that firm size 
expansion is not motivated by the maximization of shareholders’ wealth but 
is associated to the increase in CEO’s compensation (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 
2005). However, there is not much attention that focuses specifically on 
directors’ bonus with firm size. Due to the limited literature, researches that 
concluded on directors’ compensation (cash compensation) and firm size 
are being considered to develop the hypothesis.  
Studies that specifically examine the relationship between directors’ 
compensation and firm size include McGuire et al. (1962), Tosi et al. 
(2000) and Ibrahim et al. (2005). Most of these studies use total sales, 
market value, net assets and number of employee as a measure of firm size. 
However, The Central Bank and The Financial System in Malaysia Report 
(1999) states that executives are expected to maximize the shareholders’ 
value through raising a company’s share price, which is consistent with the 
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agency theory (The Central Bank and The Financial System in Malaysia 
Report, 1999). As such, strategies to increase firm size that are considered 
to be non-maximizing would be avoided as a course of action (Fattorusso, 
2006). Consequently, this has led to the following hypothesis:
H2a :  The value of directors’ bonus is negatively associated with firm size, 
as measured by total number of employee and total sales.
Power theory, on the other hand has the mirror image of this hypothesis on 
the argument that directors who posses self–serving management behavior 
will focus on self–interested objectives rather than on the shareholders. 
Generally, the relationship between directors’ compensation and firm size 
supports the power theory as it is less sensitive to performance and more 
sensitive to firm–size expansion (Choi, 2008). Therefore, directors under 
the power theory are more incline to grow the firm size rather than stock 
return and EPS. This may be due to the positive affirmations associated 
with running large corporations (Fattorusso, 2006). Consequently, it is 
hypothesized as follows:
 
H2b : The value of directors’ bonus is positively associated with firm size, 
as measured by total number of employee and total sales.
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
The companies included in the sample are drawn from all main industries 
listed on all boards of Bursa Malaysia. This contradicts that of Ibrahim et 
al. (2005) who excluded all financial companies listed at Bursa Malaysia. 
However, there are also considerably numbers of studies that do not exclude 
the finance sectors as part of the sample in addressing the same issue (eg: 
Tosi et al., 2000; Fattorusso, 2006). The sample selection from 8 main 
industries namely consumer products, industrial products, construction, 
trading or services, properties, plantation, technology, and finance is 
important to reflect the Malaysian emerging capital market as a whole. 
Besides, the sample must have all required accounting data, shares price 
and total number of employees that are available for the year 2008 until 
the year 2010 to estimate the relationship between directors’ bonus and 
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shareholders’ value as used by Fattorusso (2006).  The said period is deemed 
to be appropriate on the basis of familiarity and awareness on corporate 
governance amongst the listed companies in Malaysia. 
Only secondary data are needed for this study and the data include the 
stock prices, EPS, total number of employee and total sales which are 
collected from DataStream International which is a comprehensive database, 
containing financial information of companies listed on the exchanges and 
over the world. For the purpose of this study, companies that separately 
disclosed their directors’ bonus amounts are selected and the data are 
specifically extracted from companies’ audited report available on the Bursa 
Malaysia website. Companies with incomplete data are excluded. 
After taking into consideration on all the sample selection criteria, a total 
of 74 companies are used for the study. In addition, the samples are further 
corroborated with the samples of companies in the joint survey between 
the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) and local university, 
Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM), namely “Directors’ Remuneration 
Survey” done in 2007 to enhance the value. This is because the survey 
was performed on the top 500 PLCs based on market capitalization as 
at 31 December 2005. Due to a small sample size used in this study as 
compared to previous studies on these issues, the result of these findings is 
more appropriate to represent the companies within the sample instead of 
generalizing it to represent the public listed companies in Malaysia.
Measurement of Variables
Dependent Variable
Information on total directors’ remuneration is clearly detailed in a firm’s 
financial statements. However, information specifically on annual bonus 
required considerably more time to decipher, primarily because of the 
confusion surrounding when earned annual bonuses were actually reported 
as paid (McKnight, 1996). This is because some firms reported annual 
bonuses in the year paid (i.e. subsequent year) rather than in the year ended 
(i.e. current year) and this represents a potential timing problem (McKnight, 
1996). For the purpose of this study, the bonus amount stated in the audited 
report is considered current unless mentioned otherwise. 
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In most of the financial statements of public listed companies in Malaysia, 
the annual bonus information  normally forms a part of the ‘other short–
term benefit’ such as directors’ fee, emolument, allowances and estimated 
monetary amount of benefits–in–kind rather than presented individually as 
directors’ bonuses.  In fact, there are a great number of financial statements 
that lump the bonus figures with the basic salary as part of the directors’ 
remuneration. Using the sample employed by the Directors’ Remuneration 
Survey in 2007 by MSWG and UiTM, the number of companies that lump 
the bonus figure is 447 (89%) leaving the remaining 11% of companies 
that are included in this study’s sample size. Apparently, this might be the 
main reason for a limited data in this study. 
As such, extracting the particular bonus amount from the annual reports of 
all companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia website for the three years period 
from 2008 to 2010 is meticulous, thus requiring extra cautious. Since bonus 
is the distinctive value in this study, any vague information in the financial 
statements on directors’ bonus will be excluded from the sample. However, 
bonus with nil amounts during the year will still be included in this study.
Independent Variables
For independent variables, shareholders’ value will be explained in two 
perspectives, i.e. firm performance and firm size. Firm performance will be 
operationalized as stock return and EPS while firm size will be measured 
using total number of employee and total sales at the end of each financial 
year from 2008 to 2010. All four independent variables (stock return, EPS, 
total number of employees, and total sales) used in this study are taken from 
the companies’ financial statements. 
Stock performance is usually measured by the changes in stock price 
(Attaway, 2000). Benito and Conyon (1999) and Tosi et al. (2000) have 
used stock performance to measure the performance of firms’ stock in their 
respective studies while McKnight (1996) employs shareholders’ return in 
his study. For the purpose of this study, the variable used is consistent with 
that of Firth et al. (1996) i.e. stock return at the end of each financial year. 
Stock return is computed as changes in stock price (adjusted for capital 
changes) plus dividend per share. 
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This study further adopts EPS as the second independent variable to measure 
firm performance from the accounting–based measurement. EPS is widely 
used (eg: Randoy and Nielsen, 2002) in evaluating the operation performance 
and profitability of a company to justify the directors’ compensation as it 
is a fair reflection of a firm’s internal performance (Fattorusso, 2006). 
Basic EPS is computed using net income divided by the number of shares 
outstanding during the year.   
Roberts (1956) in Fattorusso (2006) mentioned that despite using net sales 
as the index of corporate size, other measures of corporate size did not alter 
his conclusion significantly. Due to that, the third independent variable 
adopted in the study is the total number of employee standing at the end 
of each fiscal year for all companies listed in Bursa Malaysia from 2008 
to 2010. This is in line with Tosi et al. (2000) who proposed that size is 
operationalized by firm sales, the square root of sales, the log of sales, the 
number of employees, total assets, and log of total assets. The number of 
employee considers all staff, including directors and other top management 
executives within the company. 
The study employs total sales as the fourth independent variable to be an 
alternate measurement for firm size. This is because total sales have been 
widely used as to represent the firm size. McGuire et al. (1962) have used 
the revenue figure to determine the relationship between executive income, 
sales and profit. In more recent studies, McKnight (1996) also used total 
sales to represent firm size in providing the explanation of top executive 
pay in the UK. Hence, it is crucial to expand Fattorusso’s (2006) study by 
including total sales as an additional independent variable to measure firm 
size in order to increase the reliability of the study.  
Finally, this study employs leverage ratio to be a control variable in 
examining the relationship between the four independent variables and 
directors’ bonus. This is similar with that of Duffhues and Kabir (2008) 
who assumed that companies with higher debts would be closely monitored 
by the creditors or debt holders. Hence, the companies thereby reduce the 
payment of any excess compensation to the directors. Apart from that, 
higher debts lead to higher risk, which necessitates the payment of higher 
compensation (Duffhues and Kabir, 2008).  Leverage ratio is defined as 
total debts over total assets. 
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Results and Discussion for hypotheses Tests
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables
Table 1 presents the descriptive analysis for the annual bonus received by 
the directors of companies traded in Bursa Malaysia for the periods of 2008 
to 2010. From the table, it is noticed that the highest and lowest annual 
bonus received by Malaysian directors among the public listed companies 
(within the samples selected) for the period between 2008 and 2010 are 
RM6,939,000 and RM5,000 respectively.
 
Despite that, it is also noticed that the average level of bonus received by 
directors decreased from RM411,292 in 2008 to RM370,790 in 2009 and 
this was subsequently followed by an increase to RM516,198 in 2010, 
evidenced by the mean amount presented in Table 1. Accordingly, the 
bonus growth in 2009 of 10%  sharply increased to 39% in the 2010 bonus. 
McKnight (1996) too found that the bonus growth from 1993 to 1994 grew 
at an astonishing rate of 18.32% in his 3 years study from 1992 to 1994. 
Accordingly, the median bonus amount for this study also fluctuated by 
RM15,000 in 2009 and subsequently increased by RM53,000 in 2010. This 
seems to contradict the findings of Fattorusso (2006) in which the median 
bonus figure rose by 30% (£37,000) over the 2-year period from 2001 to 
2003 among the FTSE 350 companies in the UK.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Annual Bonus by Year
year n mean median std dev min max
2008 66 411,292 164,975 712,059 9,000 4,098,000
2009 73 370,790 150,000 674,005 10,833 5,062,000
2010 71 516,198 203,150 1,001,032 5,000 6,939,000
Test of Normality 
Test of normality is performed in order to determine the most appropriate 
statistical tool to be used in the correlation analysis. The results of the 
normality test are presented in Table 2. Table 2 shows the results of the One 
– Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z normality test on all values used in the 
study. Hence, it is observed that all variables used are normally distributed 
based on the fact that p > 0.01. In addition, variables which are not normally 
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distributed have been transformed into log (similar with Conyon et al., 
1995) using SPSS 12.0. Variables that have been transformed into log are 
bonus, total number of employee and total sales. Due to that, the Pearson 
correlation analysis which is a parametric statistical tool is used to examine 
the relationship between the directors’ remuneration, i.e. BONUSlog and the 
shareholders’ value, i.e. firm performance, measured by SR and EPS and 
firm size, measured by E’EElog and SALESlog. 










BONUSlog 12.12 0.060 -0.048 0.517 0.952*
SR 0.15 0.117 -0.060 1.004 0.266*
EPS 0.16 0.118 -0.124 1.063 0.208*
E’EElog 6.89 0.089 -0.076 0.768 0.597*
SALESlog 12.81 0.116 -0.062 0.996 0.275*
LEV 0.42 0.115 -0.058 0.993 0.277*
*     Significant at the 0.01 level
Correlation Analysis
The results of the correlation analysis are shown in Table 3. Based on Table 
3, there is a positive and significant (Sig. value = 0.046) though weak (r = 
0.233) relationship between directors’ bonus and stock return.  For EPS, 
there is also a positive and significant relationship between directors’ bonus 
and EPS. However, the strength of relationship between these variables is 
moderate as compared to stock return, based on the coefficient of correlation 
value of 0.419. The relationship between directors’ bonus and firm size is 
found to be significant at any level of confidence (2-tailed), as evidenced 
by the Sig. value in the Table 2. However, the results show that total sales 
are more correlated to directors’ bonus based on the coefficient r value of 
0.527 as compared to total number of employee (coefficient r value = 0.337).
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log total sales 
(saleslog)
Pearson 
Correlation BONUSlog 1.000 .233 .419 .337 .527
SR .233 1.000 .323 .319 .399
EPS .419 .323 1.000 .581 .636
E’EElog .337 .319 .581 1.000 .783
SALESlog .527 .399 .636 .783 1.000
Sig. 
(2-tailed) BONUSlog . .046 .000 .003 .000
SR .046 . .005 .006 .000
EPS .000 .005 . .000 .000
E’EElog .003 .006 .000 . .000
SALESlog .000 .000 .000 .000 .
N BONUSlog 74 74 74 74 74
SR 74 74 74 74 74
EPS 74 74 74 74 74
E’EElog 74 74 74 74 74
SALESlog 74 74 74 74 74
Multiple Regressions Analysis 
The hypotheses developed in the study are intended to explore whether 
there is any relationship between directors’ bonus and shareholders’ value 
variables. Once the relationships have been identified, regression analysis 
is used to explore the relationship in depth. 
The relationship is expressed as an equation that predicts the dependent 
variable from a function of the independent variables (regressors) and a 
set of constants called the parameter. For the purpose of this study, the 
dependent variable is log directors’ bonus (BONUSlog) and the independent 
variables are stock return (SR), earning per share (EPS), log total number 
of employee (E’EElog), log total sales (SALESlog), and leverage ratio (LEV). 
Hence, the multiple regression equation model is as follows: 
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BONUSlog = β0 + β1 SR + β2 EPS +β3 E’EElog + β4 SALESlog + β5 LEV + e
As all variables are normally distributed, the regression analysis can 
be properly executed. In addition, several tests for auto-correlation and 
collinearity are also carried out. Hence, the Durbin–Watson test is used to 
test for auto-correlation, a condition in which a relationship exists between 
consecutive residuals (similar with that of Abdul Rahman and Zawawi, 
2005). 
The test indicates that there is no evidence of auto-correlation since the 
Durbin–Watson coefficient is 1.691 and it lies within the range of 1.69 and 
2.31. Thus, there is no time effect of the performance of the companies on the 
directors’ bonus over the observed period, i.e. 2008 to 2010.  Furthermore, 
high tolerance levels (i.e. significantly different from zero) suggest that 
collinearity or multicollinearity is unlikely, based on the data shown in Table 
4. Collinearity (or multicollinearity) is the undesirable situation where the 
correlations among the independent variables are strong. 
Table 4 contains the coefficient of determination (R-Square) that measures 
the degree of predictive accuracy of the regression model in explaining 
the variations in the dependent variable, i.e. directors’ bonus. As such, it 
is noticed that the model explains 31% of the variation in directors’ bonus 
based on the R-Square value. This means that there are other variables 
(consisting of 69%), not included in the model which are also related to 
directors’ bonus. Furthermore, due to the small number of sample size in the 
study, it is believed that the regression results do not accurately represent 
the entire population of public listed companies. However, the sig. value of 
0.000 < 0.01 shows that there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
at the 1% level of significance or higher. Hence, the regression model used 
in this study is significant and can thus be used to explain or predict the 
bonus amount received by the Malaysian directors among the public listed 
companies within the sample selected. 
In addition, the table shows that total sales seem to be the only factor that 
is significant to predict directors’ bonus as proved by the sig. value of 
0.002. This implies that there is also enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis at 1% level of confidence of higher. However, the remaining 
variables show slight or no significant effect to the variation of directors’ 
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bonus. Surprisingly, the leverage ratio being the control variable in this 
model also has no significant influence to directors’ bonus.







B std. error Beta t sig. tolerance ViF
(Constant) 6.679 1.529 4.367 .000
SR .058 .476 .013 .122 .903 .828 1.207
EPS 1.068 .879 .170 1.215 .229 .515 1.941
E’EElog -.201 .146 -.231 -1.374 .174 .357 2.798
SALESlog .520 .161 .597 3.225 .002 .297 3.372
LEV -.029 .705 -.005 -.042 .967 .717 1.394
No. of observation 74
R Square .310
Adjusted R Square .259
F 6.111
Sig. .000a
a. Predictors: Leverage ratio, EPS, stock return, log total no of employee and log total sales.
Directors’ bonus and firm performance
Looking back to the hypotheses, H1a states that the value of directors’ bonus 
is positively related to firm performance under the agency theory. In order 
to have a better discussion, the findings are separated into stock return and 
EPS in its respective paragraph as follows: 
Based on the Sig. value of 0.903 in Table 4, the null hypothesis is accepted 
since there is no significant relationship between directors’ bonus and stock 
return. This finding seems to be consistent with some of the earlier studies 
conducted on directors’ remuneration (cash compensation) as limited studies 
were specifically conducted on directors’ bonus. The study is supported by 
Greg et al. (1993) who initially found a weak correlation between directors’ 
compensation and stock market valuation over the period of 1983 – 1988 
but the link subsequently disappeared over the period of 1989 to 1991. 
Moreover, Dogan and Smyth (2002) suggested that the relationship between 
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board remuneration and firm performance is ambiguous in Malaysia, over 
a study period between 1989 and 2000.
For EPS, the study found a positive relationship between EPS and directors’ 
bonus. This is consistent with that of McKnight (1996) who found a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between changes in EPS and changes 
in annual bonuses for the sample throughout 1992 until 1994 in the UK. On 
the contrary, Randoy and Nielsen (2002) found no significant relationship 
between CEOs’ compensation and EPS in 224 companies from Norway 
and Sweden within the period from 1996 to 1998.
As such, the results of this study for both firm performance measures, 
i.e. stock return and EPS provide partial support for H1a which states that 
the value of directors’ bonus is positively related to firm performance, as 
measured by stock return and EPS under the agency theory. This is because 
H1a is accepted when firm performance is measured using EPS while the 
null hypothesis is accepted when firm performance is measured using stock 
return. Since the results for firm performance seem to partly accept the H1a, 
by implication the study also partly rejects H1b.  
Consequently, H1a that states the value of directors’ bonus is positively 
associated with firm performance, i.e. stock return and EPS under the agency 
theory is partly accepted. On a contradictive perspective, H1b that states the 
value of directors’ bonus is negatively associated with firm performance 
under the power theory is therefore partly rejected as well. In other words, 
the results of this study support agency theory when firm performance is 
measured using EPS while no significant pay – performance relationship is 
found in this study when firm performance is measured using stock return. 
Overall, the results imply that Malaysian directors in the public listed 
companies (within the sample selected) are more transparent since the 
results show a positive relationship between directors’ bonus and EPS 
(accounting – based performance measure). This is because Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) state that a positive sign of accounting base performance may 
yield information that is valuable in assessing an executive’s unobservable 
actions. 
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Directors’ bonus and firm Size
It is common knowledge that larger firms normally give higher compensation. 
This general argument seems to be inconsistent with the third hypothesis, 
H2a which states that the value of directors’ bonus is negatively associated 
with firm size, as measured by total number of employee and total sales 
under the power theory. For a better discussion of results, the total number 
of employees and total sales are separately discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  
The study found a negative relationship between directors’ bonus and total 
number of employee. As such, these results contradicted those of Fattorusso 
(2006) who suggested that firm size, as measured by number of employees 
was weakly but positively related to bonus pay. Besides, the findings 
generally did not agree with the assumption that bigger companies which 
had complex responsibilities tended to pay more to their directors due to the 
fact that they had more complex and demanding tasks (Ibrahim et al., 2005). 
Total sales, however was found to be positively significant in explaining 
directors’ bonus. This was consistent with that of McKnight (1996) who 
found an eminently strong and positive association between annual bonus 
and total sales which proposed that a 10% larger firm (using total sales) will 
pay its executives on average 11.2% greater in bonus. Perhaps, most of the 
public listed companies within the sample of the study strive to increase 
its sales as it has been said that increasing the volume of sales will achieve 
greater prestige and eventually lead to higher compensation (Murphy, 1985; 
Ibrahim et al., 2005).
Under the agency theory, any related effort to increase the firm size either 
by the total number of employee or total sales is considered contradicting 
in maximizing the shareholders’ value. Therefore, the results of this study 
for both firm size measures provided partial support for hypothesis H2a 
which states that the value of directors’ bonus is negatively related to firm 
size, as measured by total number of employees and total sales under the 
agency theory. This is because H2a, is accepted when firm size is measured 
using total number of employees but is rejected when firm size is measured 
using total sales. Since the results for firm size seemed to partly accept the 
H2a, thus by implication the study also partly accepted H2b.  
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Consequently, H2a states the value of directors’ bonus is negatively 
associated with firm size, i.e. total number of employee and total sales under 
the agency theory is partly accepted. On a contradictive perspective, H2b 
that states the value of directors’ bonus is positively associated with firm 
size, i.e. total number of employee and total sales under the power theory is 
therefore partly accepted as well. In other words, the results support agency 
theory when firm size is measured using total number of employee while 
power theory is supported when firm size is measured using total sales.  
Conclusions
The study performed descriptive, correlation and multiple regression 
analyses in order to achieve its objectives. The results from the descriptive 
analysis showed that trend of bonus received by the executive directors in 
the Malaysian listed companies (within the sample size) during the period 
of study from 2008 to 2010 fluctuated as evidenced by the average value of 
bonus from RM411,000 in 2008 which decreased to RM371,000 in 2009 
and subsequently increased to RM516,000 in 2006. The results from the 
regression analysis provided that the directors’ bonus was positively related 
to firm performance as measured using EPS while no significant relationship 
was found between directors’ bonus and stock return. In addition, directors’ 
bonus was also found to be positively related to firm size as measured by 
the total sales and negatively related to firm size as measured by the total 
number of employees. 
Based on the overall findings, it is observed that the principle of corporate 
governance, particularly on directors’ remuneration as exclusively 
represented by the directors’ bonus is being well practiced in the Malaysian 
context, particularly for the public listed companies that fall within the 
sample of the study during the period between 2008 and 2010. This is 
because corporate governance, which is consistent with agency theory, 
seemed to be proven by the findings of this study. 
At the very least, it is too soon to conclude on the basis of prior research. 
However, two out of four variables in this study i.e. EPS and total number 
of employee supported agency theory at best. Power theory, however was 
only supported by total sales while stock return did not support any of the 
theories due to no significant association with directors’ bonus.  
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Even though the length of the study period was short and thus, provided a 
limited view on directors’ bonus in Malaysia as a whole, it is believed that 
this study contributed to the existing knowledge on corporate governance, 
specifically in respect of directors’ remuneration. Furthermore, this study 
had four characteristics that made it distinctive (replicated from Fattorusso, 
2006).
This study distinguished itself from the others in ways that can be explained 
based on certain measures.  First, many empirical studies on directors’ 
remuneration conducted in the past had utilized data from the US and UK. 
Therefore, due to the shortage of research on directors’ remuneration that 
utilized the Malaysian evidence, the present study focused on the Malaysian 
context, specifically on companies that were publicly listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. Secondly, much of the past research on directors’ remuneration 
had focused on aggregate pay measures. As a result, a few studies had 
analyzed exclusively the relationship between bonus pay, as a single feature 
of directors’ remuneration and shareholders’ value, further defined as firm 
performance and firms’ size. Third, the data were current and based on three 
consecutive years, i.e. 2008 – 2010, that is after the grace period of ten 
years from the year when The Committee carried out a study on corporate 
governance and Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) was 
established, i.e. in 1998. And finally, this study used two prominent theories 
in the executive pay literature, i.e. agency theory and power theory, in order 
to explain the relationship between directors’ bonus and shareholders’ value. 
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